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Abstract
Using monthly balance-sheet data of all major German credit banks,
we analyze deposit withdrawals and bank failures in the German banking
and currency crisis of 1931. We show that deposit withdrawals were related
to indicators of banks liquidity and solvency and were hence not simply
the consequence of a run on the German currency. We Þnd no evidence
that branch banks were more stable than unit banks. Finally, we show
that larger banks had a lower probability of failure, were more likely to be
bailed out by the public authorities, and were granted preferential access to
the Reichsbanks discount window. We interpret these results as evidence
for a too-big-to-fail phenomenon. (JEL: G21, E5, N24, C34)
Keywords: Deposit withdrawals, bank failures, too big to fail, Great
Depression.
1 Introduction
In 1931, the German economy was shaken by a crisis that led not only to the
breakdown of the banking system, but also to the factual abandonment of the
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gold standard in Germany. There is an ongoing debate how the banking and
the currency crises were related. The older literature placed a lot of emphasis
on (microeconomic) problems in the banking system that were largely indepen-
dent of the currency problems. However, there is a growing number of authors
who consider the banking crisis as being largely the consequence of the currency
problems.1 The argument goes that depositors withdrew their funds not because
of the weaknesses in the banking sector, but because of the waning faith in Ger-
manys ability and willingness to service its foreign debt and in the stability of
the Reichsmark.
In a recent paper (Schnabel 2002), we have argued that the crisis was not
merely a currency crisis, but that there were fundamental weaknesses in the Ger-
man banking system that contributed to the occurrence and the severity of the
crisis. We showed that the banking sector exhibited a large degree of hetero-
geneity with the great branch banks standing out due to their particularly poor
performance both before and during the crisis. This is all the more surprising
as these banks may have been expected to be the most stable due to their size
and their widespread branch networks. The great branch banks liked to picture
themselves as the innocent victims of a run on the German currency, which had
hit them particularly hard due to their high holdings of foreign deposits. The
Reichsbank used a similar justiÞcation for their generous liquidity support to
banks that were already insolvent, such as Danatbank and Dresdner Bank: The
support was said to be necessary to prevent foreign depositors from withdraw-
ing their funds, thereby endangering the stability of the gold standard. In spite
of their poor economic performance, none of the great branch banks failed in
the end because all of them were saved through large capital injections, deposit
guarantees, and generous loans by the public authorities.
After the crisis, the tone of the discussion shifted. Now the banks were accused
of having caused the crisis by their irresponsible business policies. This also
1See, e.g., Hardach (1976), Balderston (1994), Ferguson and Temin (2001).
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remained the consensus among the scholars of the German crisis over the following
decades.2 Interestingly, the more recent literature on the German crisis appears
to be moving back to the Þrst version of the story. This shift was initiated by
Hardach (1976) who  rightly  criticized the exclusive focus on the banking issue
and gave more emphasis to the currency side of the problem. In our view, the
ensuing literature has, however, put too much emphasis on the currency problems
and has mostly neglected the banking side of the crisis.
The goal of this paper is to shed new light on this old issue on the basis of
disaggregated data. So far, most accounts of the banking crisis rely either on
aggregate data, sometimes distinguishing between different bank groups, or on
individual data on the six great banks that were all located in Berlin.3 In our
analysis, we employ a panel data set of the monthly balance sheets of all major
German credit banks, covering the years 1928 to 1932. This data set reveals a
substantial heterogeneity in the evolution of deposits across different banks. This
suggests that a purely macroeconomic explanation of the crisis does not go very
far. We try to explain this heterogeneity in a regression of deposit changes on
bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables, controlling for non-random
sample attrition by employing a Heckman correction model. We will explain in
some detail why it may be more appropriate to study the evolution of deposits
than to analyze bank failures only, as has been done in most of the existing
literature.4 We also analyze public standby activities to Þnd out whether large
banks received privileged treatment in times of crisis.
Our analysis is based on three hypotheses. The Þrst hypothesis, named the
currency-crisis hypothesis, states that the German crisis was a pure currency
crisis and that deposit withdrawals were merely the consequence of a run on
the German currency. In this case we would expect deposit withdrawals to be
2See, e.g., Born (1967).
3One notable exception is Petri (1998) who tries to explain bank distress on the basis of
disaggregated data in a microeconometric duration analysis.
4In fact, outright failures were a minor problem in the German crisis of 1931 because the
protagonists of the crisis, the great branch banks, were not allowed to fail.
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particularly strong in times of currency turmoil. Despite the macroeconomic
nature of currency problems, the heterogeneity of deposit withdrawals as such
would not be sufficient to reject this hypothesis. The reason is that banks may
differ with respect to their exposure towards such macroeconomic risks. For
example, foreign depositors are likely to react more strongly than domestic ones.
Therefore, we would expect those banks to be affected most that have the highest
levels of foreign deposits. In contrast, deposit withdrawals should not be linked
to indicators of individual banks solvency or liquidity. The emphasis will be on
this latter point. There is no doubt that the currency issue played a role. The
question is whether there is an additional effect that can be linked to the banks
strength.
The second hypothesis, the branching hypothesis states that branch banks
are more stable than unit banks due to a better diversiÞcation on both the assets
and the liabilities sides of their balance sheets. This hypothesis goes back to the
widely held belief that American banks were particularly fragile during the Great
Depression because interstate branching was prohibited. However, this hypothesis
stands in a stark contrast to the observation that the banks with nationwide
branch networks suffered most in the German crisis. By controlling for the banks
branch structure, we try to Þnd out whether there was a signiÞcant relationship
between the banks stability and their maintenance of branch networks in the
German crisis.
The third, and maybe most interesting hypothesis states that larger banks had
a lower probability of failure than smaller banks because they had a higher prob-
ability of being saved by the public authorities in case of a crisis. This hypothesis
is named the too-big-to-fail hypothesis. The resulting moral-hazard problem
should translate into higher risk-taking at large banks and into higher deposit
growth, i.e., lower withdrawals, holding constant the riskiness of the banks port-
folios. In Schnabel (2002), we have argued that the great branch banks exhibited
particularly risky business policies due to an implicit public guarantee. Here we
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concentrate on the other predictions of the hypothesis, namely the impact of a
banks size on the probability of survival, on the probability and extent of sup-
porting activities by the public authorities, and on deposit growth. The question
is whether we can Þnd statistical evidence for the too-big-to-fail phenomenon
in addition to the descriptive evidence given in the other paper. The empirical
challenge will be to separate the effect of size from other factors, such as the
existence of a nationwide branch network.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: First, there is strong evi-
dence that the German crisis cannot be described as a pure currency crisis, but
that banking problems constituted an important part of the story. Indicators
of banks liquidity and solvency show a signiÞcant, independent impact on both
deposit growth and bank failures. Second, there is no evidence that branch banks
were more stable than unit banks.5 Branch banks exhibited neither lower deposit
withdrawals, nor a lower probability of failure. Regional shocks as measured by
regional employment had no signiÞcant impact on deposit changes or on the prob-
ability of failure. This indicates that national shocks were more prevalent in the
crisis than regional shocks. Third, there is strong evidence for large banks having
had a higher probability of survival than smaller banks and somewhat weaker ev-
idence that this also translated into lower deposit withdrawals, controlling for the
riskiness of banks portfolios. These results are consistent with a too-big-to-fail
argument, but they also could be due to the effects of diversiÞcation. We further
show that large banks were indeed more likely to be supported in the crisis and
that they received preferential access to the Reichsbanks discount window. This
clearly supports the too-big-to-fail hypothesis.
For the United States, there exist several microeconometric studies on the
banking crises during the Great Depression.6 Most of these studies have focused
5Carlson (2000) Þnds similar evidence for US banks during the Great Depression. In fact,
branch banks are found to be less likely to survive and to survive for shorter periods of time,
which contradicts the conventional wisdom.
6Examples are White (1984), Saunders and Wilson (1996), Calomiris and Mason (1997),
Calomiris and Mason (2000), Carlson (2000). Wicker (1996) also makes use of disaggregated
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on the explanation of bank failures rather than deposit changes.7 One of the
reasons seems to have been the limitations of the employed data sets in the time
series dimension. To our knowledge, the only microeconometric paper on the
German crisis is a paper by Petri (1998) who implements a survival analysis on
German banks, similar to the ones done for the United States. Our paper differs
from the one by Petri in several respects: First, our focus is on modeling deposit
changes instead of bank failures. In fact, the estimation procedure used to correct
for non-random sample attrition implies that deposit changes and bank failures
are modeled simultaneously. Second, we employ a richer data set, which enables
us to test the three hypotheses mentioned above. Most importantly, we collected
data on banks foreign debt, while Petri uses medium-term deposits as a proxy. In
addition, we collected data on the branch structure of banks and regional data to
control for regional shocks. And Þnally, we also analyze public support activities
and the provision of liquidity to banks by the Reichsbank.
The analysis will proceed as follows. We formulate the three hypotheses out-
lined above in more detail in section 2. In section 3, we describe the data set
and its major properties. Section 4 contains the econometric analysis of deposit
changes. We Þrst outline the econometric procedure and then present the re-
sults of our regression analysis and the corresponding robustness checks. The
econometric analysis of standby activities can be found in section 5. Section 6
concludes. The appendix in section 7 contains a number of supplementary tables
and the estimation results for some of the regressions described in the robustness
sections.
data, while not using econometric techniques.
7One notable exception is the paper by Saunders and Wilson (1996).
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2 Hypotheses
2.1 Hypothesis 1: Currency-crisis hypothesis
The currency-crisis hypothesis states that the German banking crisis was merely
the result of the concurrent currency crisis.8 Deposits were withdrawn from Ger-
man banks not because these banks were weak, but because depositors wanted to
move their funds outside of Germany. This hypothesis requires two pieces of ev-
idence: First, changes in deposits should be related to indicators of the currency
problems, such as the Reichsbanks gold cover or the exchange rate. Second,
changes in deposits should not be related to indicators of individual banks sol-
vency or liquidity, such as equity or liquidity ratios. A rejection of the latter point
would at the same time lend support to the view that depositors distinguished
between good and bad banks. Note that the hypothesis does not imply that
there is no heterogeneity across banks. Macroeconomic shocks such as currency
problems do not have to affect all banks in the same way, as the exposure to
macroeconomic risk may differ across banks. In fact, we may expect the currency
problems to affect those banks most strongly that have the most mobile depos-
itors. This would Þrst of all be foreign depositors. Therefore, one should control
for the share of foreign deposits in total deposits.
2.2 Hypothesis 2: Branching hypothesis
The branching hypothesis states that banks maintaining branch networks are
more stable than unit banks. This is a widely maintained hypothesis that was
based on the observation that a country like the United States with severe branch-
ing restrictions suffered much more from bank failures than a country like Canada
where interstate branching was possible.9 Branch banks should be more diver-
siÞed both on the asset and on the liabilities sides and should therefore be less
8Versions of this hypothesis have been stated by Hardach (1976), Balderston (1994), Petri
(1998), and Ferguson and Temin (2001).
9This hypothesis was Þrst stated by Friedman and Schwarz (1963, pp. 352) and has been
reiterated, for example, by White (1984), Bordo (1986), Grossman (1994), and Calomiris (2000).
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vulnerable to local or regional asset and liquidity shocks. The branching hypoth-
esis implies that banks maintaining branch networks suffered from lower deposit
withdrawals and were less likely to fail than unit banks. This can be checked by
including branching variables in the estimation equations. One problem arises
from the fact that banks with large branch networks typically are large banks.
Therefore, it is important to try to separate the effects of size and branching, for
example, by simultaneously including a measure of size, such as total assets.
It should be noted that the rejection of the branching hypothesis does not
imply that branch networks never offer any protection to banks. A rejection
could, for example, also be due to the prevalence of national instead of regional
shocks.
2.3 Hypothesis 3: Too-big-to-fail hypothesis
According to the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, larger banks have a lower probabil-
ity of failure than smaller banks because they have a higher probability of being
saved by the public authorities in case of a crisis. The resulting moral-hazard
problem should show up in higher risk-taking at large banks and in higher de-
posit growth, holding constant the riskiness of the banks portfolios.
The hypothesis can be checked either by looking at bank survival, at the
actual supporting activities by the public authorities, at the riskiness of banks
business strategies, or at banks deposit growth. We get the following empirical
predictions: First, large banks are more likely to survive, i.e., the probability of
survival should depend positively on the size of the bank. Second, large banks
beneÞt more from public supporting activities. Hence, the probability of being
supported should also be positively related to the size of banks. Apart from look-
ing at the discrete standby activities, one can also analyze the liquidity provision
by the central bank. If large banks are too big to fail, the Reichsbank should
privilege them in the provision of liquidity, especially in times of crisis. Third,
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large banks should exhibit excessive risk-taking.10 Finally, the size of banks
should have a positive impact on banks deposit growth, holding constant the
banks riskiness.
The greater stability of banks alone is not sufficient to conÞrm the too-big-
to-fail hypothesis because this could also be due to diversiÞcation effects. In this
light, the additional analysis of observed public support activities is particularly
instructive. In addition, it is important to try to control for diversiÞcation effects,
e.g., by including variables on branching.
3 Data
3.1 Description of data sources
In this section, we describe the major data sources used in this study. All variables
used in our econometric analysis are either in monthly frequency, or are constant
over time. The data fall into three categories: bank balance-sheet data, other
bank data, and aggregate (national or regional) data. A detailed list of the
descriptive statistics and sources of the variables used in the analysis can be
found in table A2 in the appendix.
3.1.1 Balance-sheet data
The main data source used in this study are the monthly balance sheets of Ger-
man banks, which were published in Deutscher Reichs- und Preußischer Staats-
anzeiger. The publication of interim balance sheets started in 1911 as a conse-
quence of an official examination of the banking sector (Bankenquete) in 1908.
The public authorities were worried about the notoriously low levels of liquidity
reserves at the German banks who had learned to rely on the Reichsbank for
their liquidity. By agreeing on greater publicity, the banks were able to avoid
10We will not follow up on this issue here. Some evidence on excessive risk-taking by the
great branch banks can be found in Schnabel (2002).
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strict liquidity prescriptions.11 The obligation to publish interim balance sheets
did not apply to all banks. Only banks that wanted their shares to be autho-
rized for trading at a German stock exchange were required to publish at least
Þve interim balance sheets per year, using the balance-sheet scheme prescribed
by the Reichsbank.12 The publication of balance sheets was interrupted during
World War I, but was resumed in 1925. Monthly publication started only in
March 1928. As the prescribed balance-sheet scheme was modiÞed substantially
in March 1928, continuous series exist only from that date on. Hence, our sample
stretches from March 1928 till the end of 1932, shortly before the take-over of
power by Hitler. No monthly balances were provided for the months of December
and January to avoid interference with the annual balances. Due to the common
practice of window dressing in annual balances, there is no continuity between
the monthly and the annual balance sheets, such that the latter cannot be used
in our analysis. In addition, not all banks used the Reichsbank scheme for their
annual balances. Hence, our sample contains a total of 49 months with balance-
sheet data. The high frequency of balances is a particularly attractive property
of the data set as it also permits a detailed analysis of deposit ßows over time.
In our sample period there was a total of 153 banks who published monthly
balance sheets. About one third of these banks were the publicly owned Staats-
banken, Landesbanken, and Girozentralen (SLGs in the following). The remaining
banks were larger credit banks. The sample does not include savings banks, mort-
gage banks, and cooperative banks, as well as smaller credit banks. We decided to
exclude the SLGs from the analysis because the bulk of their business was either
with other banks or with public authorities and was hence very different from
the business of the credit banks.13 While the SLGs also suffered from a severe
11Hardach (1995, p. 918), James (1998, pp. 42).
12The publication of interim balance sheets became mandatory only after the crisis through
the enactment of the new banking law in 1934.
13The Girozentralen were the savings banks central institutes, which managed the savings
banks mandatory liquidity reserves, served as central clearing organizations, and helped in the
provision and investment of funds. The Staatsbanken and Landesbanken belonged directly to
the German states and served similar purposes as the Girozentralen.
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crisis in 1931, their problems were of a different nature than the ones of the credit
banks: they were mostly related to the excessive indebtedness of German munic-
ipalities. The currency problems played only a minor role as foreign indebtedness
of these banks was negligible. Therefore, it is in our view not appropriate to pool
these banks with the credit banks in the analysis.14 After the exclusion of the
Staatsbanken, Landesbanken, and Girozentralen, there remain 110 banks in our
sample.15
The sample is highly unbalanced in that only 50 of these banks published
balance sheets in all of the 49 months. The econometric problems arising from
this feature of the data are going to be discussed in detail below (see section 4.1).
With respect to total assets, the sample comprises almost one third of the German
banking system, and 75 percent of total assets of all German credit banks.
It should be noted that the monthly balances were so-called raw balances,
which means that the banks did not book their earnings and losses during the
year, but adjusted their capital only once a year. This means, for example, that
the monthly balances typically did not contain current allowances for deprecia-
tion. In this respect, monthly balance sheets do not yield a very complete picture
of the actual situation of a bank. The problem is most severe with respect to the
measurement of capital as well as to all items that are subject to depreciation,
such as loans and securities portfolios. Its effect is much smaller on items like
deposits or liquid means. On the other hand, monthly balance sheets have the
advantage that they tend to be subject to less window dressing than annual
balances.16
3.1.2 Other bank data
The balance-sheet data is supplemented by additional information on German
banks, which cannot be extracted from the monthly balance sheets. One variable
14In contrast, Petri (1998) uses the pooled sample of banks.
15One credit bank had to be excluded as there was only a single observation.
16Blatz (1971, p. 21).
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of major importance is banks foreign debt. Foreign debt consisted mainly of two
kinds of loans17: The Þrst kind of loan was an acceptance credit, the amount
of which can readily be inferred from banks balance sheets.18 The second 
and far more important  kind of foreign loan was a short-term cash loan with
a maturity of one to three months. Unfortunately, the amount of these loans
cannot be inferred from balance sheets directly because they were included in the
balance-sheet position other deposits that in addition contained all domestic
non-bank deposits. However, monthly reporting banks had to report their levels
of foreign debt conÞdentially to the Reichsbank on a quarterly basis. These data
were never published, but they partly exist in the Reichsbanks archival material
in the Bundesarchiv in Berlin. While the available information is not sufficient
to construct continuous time series for all the banks in our sample, we were able
to construct a measure of the level of foreign debt as of June 30, 1930.19 If the
relative importance of withdrawals of domestic and foreign deposits at German
banks was comparable across banks, this measure should be able to capture cross-
sectional differences in the vulnerability of banks to short-term capital reversals
in the German economy. In any case, it should be more reliable than the level
of medium-term deposits, which has been used by other authors as a proxy for
foreign debt.20
Another important piece of information concerns the chronology of banks
failures and mergers. We examined all the relevant issues of the periodical Die
17Enquete-Ausschuß (1930, pp. 80), Blatz (1971, pp. 98).
18The corresponding balance-sheet positions were Rembourskredite on the assets side and
Seitens der Kundschaft bei Dritten benutzte Kredite on the liabilities side. The values of
these positions - though not numerically identical - are very similar. According to the Deutsche
Bundesbank (1976), the position on the liabilities side is a reliable measure of foreign acceptance
loans even though it contains a small amount of domestic debt.
19The data on foreign debt used in this study can be found in the following Þles from the
Bundesarchiv Berlin, Reichsbank R2501: 6479, 6482, 6484, 6491-2, 6559, 6634, 6709, 6746,
7712. The construction of foreign-debt variables is described in the appendix.
20Examples are Balderston (1994, p. 49) and Petri (1998, p. 104). The use of medium-term
deposits leads on average to a strong overestimation of the share of foreign deposits: While the
average share of foreign deposits was 16 percent according to our measure on June, 30, 1930,
the alternative measure gives an average of 39 percent with the measurement error ranging
between  7 and + 91 percentage points.
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Bank, which contains a detailed chronology of all major events in the German
banking sector. Thereby, we were able to construct a fairly complete chronology
for all the banks contained in our sample. As we will explain below (see section
4.1), it is of particular importance to classify the mergers as either competitive
mergers or as distress mergers. Die Bank also contains information on the standby
activities from the side of the government or the Reichsbank. We deÞned the
standby activities to include capital injections, public guarantees, and public
loans beyond the discount and lombard loans by the Reichsbank. The ordinary
reÞnancing of banks through the Reichsbank will be treated separately in the
analysis.
Finally, we collected information on the banks branch networks from Salings
Bo¨rsenpapiere (1930).
3.1.3 Regional and national data
In addition to the data on individual banks, we collected a large number of
national and regional variables. The variables can broadly be classiÞed into the
following categories: business cycle (production, prices, employment, insolvencies,
interest rates), the currency situation (Reichsbank gold cover, exchange rate,
international interest rate differentials), the public sector (public debt, taxes,
public expenditures), monetary policy (discount rate, stock of bills at the Reichs-
bank, monetary aggregates), other Þnancial variables (stock prices), aggregate
data on the banking system (insolvencies in the banking sector, stock prices
of bank shares, deposit-to-currency ratio, concentration in the banking sector,
average interest margins), and other regional characteristics (population density,
importance of agriculture). For banks with national branch networks, we inserted
the Þgures for the German Reich when using regional variables. Not all of these
variables were actually used in the Þnal analysis.
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3.2 Descriptive analysis
Now we describe the major properties of our sample. We Þrst look at the char-
acteristics of the banks contained in our sample. Then we depict the evolution
of deposits at the aggregate level over time, as well as at the heterogeneity of
deposit changes across different bank groups. Finally, we describe the evolution
of endorsement liabilities at different bank groups.
3.2.1 Bank characteristics
Most of the 110 credit banks in our sample were universal banks. Only a small
subset of 16 banks (15%) were specialized, mostly sector-speciÞc banks. Six
banks (5%) were public credit banks, the most important being Reichs-Kredit-
Gesellschaft (RKG), the house bank of the Reichs big industrial conglomerate
VIAG.
The banks in our sample were spread all over the German Reich. The highest
numbers of banks were found in Sachsen (23 banks), Berlin (21 banks), and
Rheinprovinz (14 banks). With respect to total assets, Berlin clearly stood out
as all six of the so-called great banks were based in Berlin. While Deutsche
Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft, Darmsta¨dter und Nationalbank (Danatbank),
Dresdner Bank, and Commerz- und Privat-Bank (Commerzbank) maintained
widespread networks of branch offices, Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft and Reichs-
Kredit-Gesellschaft did not have any branch offices. Instead the great non-branch
banks maintained correspondence relationships with provincial and other credit
banks who often preferred to conduct business with banks not standing in direct
competition with them. Out of all banks, more than two thirds had at least one
branch outside of the city where they were located, and one fourth maintained
at least ten branches outside of their home base. Only eight banks maintained a
nationwide network. Besides the great branch banks21, these were Mitteldeutsche
21The six great branch banks are Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft (before their
merger), Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, Danatbank, and Deutsche Bank und Disconto-
Gesellschaft (after the merger).
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Creditbank, which was later to be merged with Commerzbank, and the publicly
owned Deutsche Bau- and Bodenbank.
The German credit banks relied heavily on foreign funds for their Þnancing,
with 29 percent of their total deposits being foreign in June 1930. However,
foreign debt was distributed very unevenly across banks, with particularly high
shares of foreign deposits at the great banks. At only one third of the credit banks,
foreign deposits constituted more than ten percent of total deposits, and at one
Þfth the share was above twenty percent. The only public bank relying heavily on
foreign deposits was Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft, with the share of foreign deposits
being 50 percent.
19 banks in our sample (17%) failed between 1928 and 1932. In addition, 12
banks (11%) received public support. Three of the supported banks still failed,
while the remaining nine survived. It is interesting to compare the four different
bank groups, the failing banks with or without public support, and the surviving
banks with or without public support. Table 1 summarizes the major Þndings.
It includes an extra column on the great branch banks for comparison.
Table 1 suggests the following preliminary observations: First, outright bank
failures played a minor role in the German crisis. The failing credit banks, sup-
ported or not supported, were very small banks with few branches and low levels
of foreign debt.22 In contrast, the banks that survived with the help of public
support were much more important in terms of total assets, foreign debt, and
the number of branches. Six of the ten largest German banks, among them all
the great branch banks, belonged to this group. In fact, the sum of total assets
of all failing banks was well below the median of total assets of the banks that
received public support and survived. Hence, the real problem in the German
crisis of 1931 were not the banks who actually failed, but the ones who survived
only with the help of the German public authorities. Finally, the surviving banks
22Of course, we observe only a subset of all bank failures in our sample. However, the failing
banks that are not contained in our sample are likely to be small as well.
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that received support had much lower liquidity and equity ratios than the banks
that survived without such support. Particularly low equity ratios were found at
the great branch banks. It should be noted that these numbers overstate the ac-
tual liquidity and solvency of the supported banks, because they already include
public liquidity and capital injections.23
All credit banks
Great
branch banks
Failing banks Surviving banks Surviving
Public support no yes no yes yes
Number of banks 16 3 64 9 4
Total assets, median (million RM) 7 11 8 352 1,815
Total assets, maximum (million RM) 19 38 1,039 3,784 3,784
# branches, median 2 3 2 83 206
# branches, maximum 17 19 154 301 301
Share of foreign deposits, median 9% 9% 9% 38% 41%
Share of foreign deposits, maximum 16% 11% 81% 48% 45%
Cash liquidity, median 1.4% 1.2% 2.5% 2.0% 1.9%
Cash liquidity, mean 2.4% 1.2% 3.0% 2.2% 1.9%
First-order liquidity, median 19% 8% 27% 20% 22%
First-order liquidity, mean 21% 8% 34% 21% 22%
Equity ratio, median 21% 14% 19% 16% 7%
Equity ratio, mean 24% 17% 22% 14% 10%
Table 1: Characteristics of different bank groups. Notes: The numbers refer to the
month before failure for failing banks, and to November 1931 for surviving banks. The
number of banks in this table is below 110 because it does not include surviving banks
that do not have valid data for November 1931. Note that the great branch banks
are also contained in the column All credit banks. The deÞnitions of liquidity and
equity ratios can be found in table A2 in the appendix. Sources: Deutscher Reichs- und
Preußischer Staatsanzeiger, Bundesarchiv Berlin (Reichsbank R2501, diverse Þles).
3.2.2 Evolution of deposits
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the Reichsbanks gold cover and the evolution of
deposits at monthly reporting banks. In addition, total deposits are split up into
foreign and domestic deposits. In Schnabel (2002), we have described in detail the
evolution of aggregate deposits and their relationship to the episodes of currency
23For example, Dresdner Banks equity more than tripled due to a capital injection of 300
million Reichsmark in July 1931.
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turmoil and banking problems before and during the crisis of 1931. Here we only
want to stress two points: First, there were two periods of high aggregate deposit
withdrawals before the actual crisis in 1931, one in spring 1929, the other in
fall 1930. These seem to have been related to the concurrent currency problems
that had been triggered by political shocks. Just as the Þnal crisis in 1931, the
two episodes showed up at basically all bank groups, including the SLGs and
the savings banks. Second, the withdrawals affected both domestic and foreign
deposits, though foreign deposits were somewhat more volatile than domestic
deposits.
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Figure 1: The Reichsbanks gold cover (white square, left scale) and total
deposits at monthly reporting banks (black rhombus, March 1928 = 100, right
scale), also split into foreign deposits (black circle) and domestic deposits (white
circle). Notes: Gaps in the graphs are due to missing data. The deÞnition of the gold
cover can be found in table A2 in the appendix. The solid line denotes the mandatory
gold cover in the gold exchange standard. Sources: Deutscher Reichs- und
Preußischer Staatsanzeiger, Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r das Deutsche Reich, James
(1985, pp. 358), Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1936).
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The histogram in Þgure 2 conveys a Þrst impression of the heterogeneity of
deposit changes across banks.24 The Þgure is to be read as follows: Each bar
shows the fraction of banks experiencing the change in deposits given by the
number on the x-axis. Deposit changes refer to the period between June 1930
and November 1931. Figure 2 reveals that there was a considerable heterogeneity
of deposit changes across banks. For some banks, deposits even increased.
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Figure 2: Histogram of changes in deposits between June 1930 and November
1931 for monthly reporting credit banks. Notes: The numbers on the x-axis are
given as fractions of the initial level. Example: A value of -0.2 denotes a decrease of
deposits by 20 percent. The graph contains only 76 banks due to missing data.
Source: Deutscher Reichs- und Preußischer Staatsanzeiger.
Table 2 shows the mean deposit changes for different bank groups, referring
again to the period between June 1930 and November 1931. Deposits at monthly
reporting credit banks decreased by 21.6 percent on average in the considered time
period. At the savings banks and at the SLGs, the respective decline in deposits
was much smaller. Also within the group of monthly reporting credit banks,
24The variable used in the following analysis is total deposits. It is the sum of the following
balance-sheet items: Foreign acceptance loans (Seitens der Kundschaft bei Dritten benutzte
Kredite), domestic interbank deposits (Deutsche Banken, BankÞrmen, Sparkassen und son-
stige deutsche Kreditinstitute), other deposits, including foreign interbank deposits (Sonstige
Kreditoren), and domestic acceptance loans (Akzepte).
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private banks displayed higher withdrawals than public banks, even though the
difference is less pronounced.
Number
of banks
June 1930 to
November 1931
Monthly reporting credit banks 76 21.6%
For comparison: Savings banks 2,570 1.7%
For comparison: SLGs 37 10.9%
Private credit banks 71 22.0%
Public credit banks 5 15.1%
10 largest credit banks 10 30.0%
Banks other than 10 largest credit banks 66 20.3%
1 branch 23 21.8%
# branches > 1, not nationally 48 20.8%
Nationwide branch network 5 27.9%
Foreign debt < 10% 50 18.9%
Foreign debt ≥ 10% 26 26.7%
Specialized banks 11 27.4%
Universal banks 65 20.6%
Banks with public support 10 31.8%
Banks without public support 66 20.0%
Table 2: Percentage change in deposits between June 1930 and November 1931
for different bank groups. Notes: The numbers show the means of the respective
bank groups. The table contains all banks for which deposit data was available at
both dates. Sources: Deutscher Reichs- und Preußischer Staatsanzeiger, Statistisches
Jahrbuch fu¨r das Deutsche Reich.
The highest withdrawals of deposits were found at the ten largest credit banks
who lost 30.0 percent of their deposits, while the remaining banks lost only 20.3
percent on average. Hence, there is no evidence on the basis of the raw data
that large banks were perceived as being particularly safe. Interestingly, the
relationship between withdrawals and branching is not monotonic, as the highest
withdrawals were found at the banks maintaining nationwide branch networks,
while the lowest withdrawals were found at banks maintaining regional branch
networks. This cannot easily be reconciled with the view that branch banks
were more stable than non-branch banks. As expected, banks with high shares of
foreign deposits show particularly high deposit withdrawals. Higher-than-average
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withdrawals were also found at specialized banks. Finally, the banks who received
public support were banks that had lost particularly high shares of their deposits.
As the following regression analysis will show, not all results that come out of
this simple descriptive analysis are preserved once we control appropriately for
all relevant factors.
3.2.3 Evolution of endorsement liabilities
The discounting of bills was the major instrument of the Reichsbank for providing
liquidity to the banking sector. Open market operations were still uncommon at
that time, and the amount of lombard loans was small compared to the discount-
ing of bills. The extent of discounting can be assessed by analyzing the evolution
of endorsement liabilities of banks. Figure 3 displays the evolution of other
endorsement liabilities, the variable that is going to be used in the regression
analysis. This off-balance-sheet item comprises all the bills of exchange that a
bank has passed on, apart from bank acceptances and promissory notes (So-
lawechsel). The variable is used as a proxy for the level of outstanding discount
loans that the bank has obtained from the Reichsbank. Even though the item
may also comprise other bills, its growth is likely to be governed by the changes
in rediscounting. We decided to exclude bank acceptances and promissory notes
because they were generally not discountable at the Reichsbank, but were mostly
sold on a separate market (Privatdiskontmarkt) to which not all banks were
admitted. Therefore, only a small share of banks held these types of bills.25
25In fact, the Reichsbank also discounted the other two types of bills in the crisis, thereby
breaching the banking law. Therefore, we also ran regressions using total endorsement liabilities.
All main results are unchanged (see the robustness section 5.3).
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Figure 3: Other endorsement liabilities at largest monthly reporting credit
banks (black circle) and at other monthly reporting credit banks (white circle),
February 1929 = 100. Notes: The largest credit banks comprise the great Berlin
banks and the four largest provincial banks; in addition, they contain all banks that
were merged to any of these banks in the considered period. The group other credit
banks refers to a constant sample of 59 banks. Gaps in the graphs are due to missing
data. Source: Deutscher Reichs- und Preußischer Staatsanzeiger.
The Þgure shows the evolution of other endorsement liabilities for two differ-
ent bank groups, the largest monthly reporting credit banks and the remaining
monthly reporting credit banks. We Þnd that in all three episodes of currency
turmoil and banking problems  spring 1929, fall 1930, and summer 1931  there
was a sharp increase in endorsement liabilities at the largest banks. At the other
credit banks, endorsement liabilities also increased in these months, but only
mildly compared to the largest banks. The question to be answered in the follow-
ing econometric analysis is why the increase in discount loans in times of crisis
was so strong at the large banks compared to other banks. In the preceding sec-
tion, we have seen that the largest banks also were the ones who lost the highest
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shares of their deposits. So one possible explanation for the observed differences
in discounting is that the larger banks had the highest liquidity needs due to
particularly strong deposit withdrawals. Alternatively, the Reichsbank may have
discounted more bills from banks who held high levels of foreign deposits to pre-
vent a panic among foreign depositors. In fact, this was the explanation that
was disseminated officially. Finally, it may be that large banks were given pref-
erential access to the Reichsbanks rediscounting facilities due to their economic
signiÞcance as would be predicted by the too-big-to-fail hypothesis.
4 Econometric analysis of deposit changes
4.1 Estimation procedure
Most existing microeconometric studies on banking crises model the incidence
of bank failures in the context of a hazard model.26 In this section, we explain
why it is more appropriate to model deposit changes instead of bank failures in
our context. For this purpose, we Þrst want to clarify the relationship between
deposit withdrawals and bank failures and their connection to the notions of
illiquidity and insolvency. Then, we outline the implications for our empirical
analysis. Finally, we describe how the interaction of deposit changes and bank
failures can be modeled econometrically.
4.1.1 Deposit changes and bank failures
A bank failure occurs when a bank is not able to satisfy its payment obligations
or when the banks capital becomes negative. There are basically two reasons
for this to happen: Þrst, abnormally high deposit withdrawals, and second,
a negative asset shock. This distinction has inspired two different strands of
literature, one stressing the liabilities side, the other emphasizing the asset side
of a banks balance sheet in explaining the failure of a bank.27
26Examples are Petri (1998) and Calomiris and Mason (2000).
27This classiÞcation has been introduced by Calomiris and Gorton (1991). They named the
Þrst strand of literature the asymmetric information approach and the second the random
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The Þrst strand of literature starts from the observation that banks are illiquid
in the sense that their deposits are more liquid than their assets, or that the
liquidation value of assets is below the nominal value of deposits.28 Given the
non-contingent nature of the standard bank deposit contract, this means that
no bank is able to honor all claims if a sufficiently large number of creditors
demands repayment. Hence, deposit withdrawals can force a bank into failure
even in the absence of asset shocks. Deposit withdrawals could be triggered
either by self-fulÞlling beliefs as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), or by exogenous
liquidity shocks to depositors. Whether a bank succumbs to the run or not,
depends on the intensity of deposits withdrawals and on the degree of maturity
transformation that the bank has carried out, i.e., its liquidity. It also depends
on the initial level of the banks capital, which can serve as a buffer for losses
from the liquidation of long-term assets.
The second strand of the literature emphasizes the problem of asymmetric
information between depositors and banks about the value of the banks portfo-
lios.29 Depositors only receive (macro- or microeconomic) noisy signals about the
value of their banks assets and they then have to decide whether to withdraw
their deposits or not. Hence, bank runs are triggered by adverse information
about banks asset values, and they have therefore been named information-
based runs. If the depositors decide to withdraw their funds, there are three
possible constellations: First, the bank is really insolvent and this insolvency is
revealed by the bank run; second, the bank was solvent before the run, but it
fails because it cannot honor the demands of its depositors who (wrongly) believe
that the bank is insolvent30; and third, the bank was solvent before the run and
withdrawal approach.
28This literature was started by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and has
been extremely inßuential until today.
29Early contributions were the papers by Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and
Bhattacharya (1988). Calomiris and Kahn (1991) use a similar framework emphasizing the
moral-hazard problem on the side of the bank manager. Chen (1999) uses an asymmetric
information setup to model informational contagion between banks.
30Here the insolvency is caused by the run itself, just as in the Þrst strand of literature.
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remains solvent, either because withdrawals were not strong enough or because
there are no costs of liquidation for the bank. A further possibility is that an
insolvent bank is closed even before deposits are withdrawn.
These observations have several implications for our empirical analysis. First,
the relationship between the strength of a bank and bank failure cannot be used
to distinguish between the two types of explanations outlined above. In the liter-
ature, a signiÞcant correlation between indicators for banks solvency or liquidity
and the probability of (or time until) bank failure has often been interpreted as
evidence for the asymmetric information view of bank runs.31 However, the
probability of failure may depend on the liquidity and equity ratios of banks not
only because depositors run on banks that appear to be weak, but also because
an illiquid bank with little capital may be less able to withstand a run driven by
random withdrawals. This interpretational problem does not arise when de-
posit changes are used as the dependent variable: A signiÞcant positive correlation
between banks solvency or liquidity and the size of deposit changes justiÞably
can be interpreted as evidence for the hypothesis that depositors are reacting on
the information about their bank and withdraw their funds primarily from bad
banks. In this sense, an analysis of deposit changes is more informative than an
analysis of bank failures.
The evaluation of the currency-crisis hypothesis is related to the distinction
between the two types of theories outlined above. The currency-type explana-
tion explains the German banking crisis as being driven by depositors who have
exogenous liquidity needs because they want to transfer their funds abroad. In
contrast, the banking-type explanation supposes that depositors withdraw funds
from banks that are perceived to be weak. Therefore, the examination of the
currency-crisis hypothesis is conceptually similar to the distinction between
the asymmetric information and the random withdrawal approaches.
A second implication is that there exists no one-to-one relationship between
31See, e.g., Petri (1998) and Calomiris and Mason (2000).
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deposit withdrawals and bank failures. Deposit withdrawals may lead to bank
failures, but they do not have to, and bank failures may be caused by deposit
withdrawals, but they do not have to.32 Deposit changes and bank failures are
distinct phenomena and should also be treated separately in an empirical anal-
ysis. However, there are a number of interactions between the two phenomena,
which have to be taken into account. It would not be appropriate to consider de-
posit changes independently of bank failures because the presence in the sample
depends on deposit changes and is, hence, not random. In the following section,
we describe how the interactions between deposit changes and bank failures can
be modeled econometrically.
4.1.2 Non-random sample attrition
In econometric terms, our sample is subject to a problem of non-random sample
attrition: Banks join and leave the sample within our sample period, and the
selection into the sample of reporting banks is not random, but depends itself on
the changes in deposits. We treat the joining decision as random as there are no
reasons to believe that the joining of the sample is related to the growth rate of
deposits. With respect to leaving the sample, the problem is complicated by the
fact that we do not observe the failure of a bank, but we only observe whether
a bank published a monthly balance sheet or not. A further complication arises
from mergers taking place in our sample period. We want to distinguish the
following types of leaving the sample:
1. The bank leaves the sample due to failure.
2. The bank leaves the sample due to merger:
(a) The bank merges with another bank for reasons of synergy effects.
(b) The bank is close to failure and is taken over by another bank.
32In econometric terms, this means that there is not simply a univariate censoring problem,
where deposit withdrawals are only observed if they are below a certain threshold.
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(c) The bank takes over another bank that is close to failure.
3. The bank leaves the sample randomly, e.g., because it decides not to
publish monthly balances anymore.
The most problematic cases for our analysis are the cases 1. and 2b. because
they are likely to be related to deposit changes. In our analysis, we do not
distinguish between these two cases, but they are both treated as failures. The
other kinds of sample attrition are treated as random events. Banks resulting
from mergers are treated as new banks.33
The described selection problem can be modeled in the framework of a simple
bivariate model in the spirit of Heckman (1979). This has the nice side effect
that we can simultaneously model the evolution of deposits and the occurrence
of a bank failure.
The evolution of deposits is described by the following equation:
d∗it = xitβ + εit, (1)
where dit is the (latent) monthly growth rate of deposits of bank i at time t and xit
is a vector of bank-speciÞc, region-speciÞc, macroeconomic and other explanatory
variables. Selection into the sample is determined by the following equation:
p∗it = zitα+ νit, (2)
where p∗it is the latent proÞtability of bank i at time t. We assume that the
two disturbance terms are jointly normal with correlation coefficient ρ. The
observation rule is as follows: If p∗it ≥ 0, the bank owners decide to keep the bank
open (indicated by a binary variable, which is equal to one in this case) and we
observe the true value of d∗it. If p
∗
it < 0, the bank is closed (again indicated by the
33Practically, it is not easy to distinguish the cases 2a. and 2b. or 2c., because what we
observe directly is only the merger. The classiÞcation was done on the basis of the information
reported in the periodical Die Bank. In those cases where the periodical did not contain any
indication that a bank was in distress, a merger was classiÞed as a competitive merger. A list
of all failures, distress mergers, and public standby activities can be found in the appendix.
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binary variable, which is equal to zero in this case) and we do not observe latent
deposit growth. In both cases, we observe the control variables x and z.
In principle, the parameters in this model are identiÞed through functional
form assumptions. However, identiÞcation is generally believed to be more cred-
ible if one includes at least one variable in the selection equation that is not
contained in the equation of interest. In our case, there is a natural way of iden-
tiÞcation. Monthly balance sheets were published with a delay of almost a full
month. For instance, the balance sheet referring to March 1928 was published
at the end of April 1928. Hence, depositors could react to this balance sheet no
earlier than in May 1928. In contrast, the probability of failure clearly would
depend on the most recent balance-sheet Þgures.
So far we have not exploited the panel structure of the data. One could
also estimate the model as a dynamic panel, using the procedure proposed by
Arrelano and Bond (1991). However, this procedure estimates the model in Þrst
differences, implying that all factors that are time-invariant, such as branching
and foreign debt, could not be identiÞed. Therefore, we decided to estimate the
model with the pooled data set.
4.2 Estimation results
Table 3 presents the results for our main regression equation.34 The exact deÞni-
tions of all variables can be found in table A2 in the appendix. The upper part
of the panel contains the regression coefficients for the deposit equation, while
the lower part shows the results for the selection equation. The dependent vari-
able in the main equation is the logarithm of the growth factor of total deposits
at German credit banks. The use of growth factors is preferable to the use of
levels since the levels of variables as deposits are typically non-stationary. The
logarithms are used to remove the skewness from the dependent variable and to
transform the growth factor into a variable that is deÞned on the whole real line.
34Note that we used robust standard errors throughout.
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In the selection equation, the dependent variable is a dummy variable, which is
equal to one if the banks balance sheet is observed and zero in the month when
the bank leaves the sample.
4.2.1 Deposit equation
First, we are going to interpret the results from the deposit equation. The results
show that the currency problems had a signiÞcant impact on deposit changes at
German banks. The variable gold cover enters the equation with a positive sign
and is highly signiÞcant. We also Þnd that banks holding high levels of foreign
debt showed a signiÞcantly slower deposit growth than other banks, which is
in line with the idea that foreign depositors reacted more strongly to currency
problems than domestic depositors.35 At the same time, the results strongly reject
the hypothesis that the German crisis of 1931 was a pure currency crisis. There
is a positive and signiÞcant relationship between a banks cash liquidity ratio
and its changes in deposits. Moreover, lagged deposit changes positively affect
current deposit changes. One possible interpretation is that depositors consider
banks as fragile that suffered from high deposit withdrawals in the past and that
they tend to withdraw their deposits from these banks.
The equity ratio has the expected sign, but is insigniÞcant; however, one
should keep in mind that book capital is a rather poor proxy of a banks prof-
itability. The losses of banks from the depreciation of their stock portfolios are
measured by the variable stocks, which is the growth of a general stock index
interacted with the banks share of stocks in total assets. This variable, too, is
insigniÞcant.
35Alternatively, one can interact the gold cover variable with a measure of banks foreign debt
holdings. In fact, the interacted variable proves to be highly signiÞcant.
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Dependent 
variable
Independent 
variables
Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value
Deposit 
growth
Deposit growth (-2) 0.0415 0.0322 0.197
Deposit growth (-3) 0.0752 0.0270 0.005
Cash liquidity (-2) 0.0078 0.0020 0.000
Equity ratio (-2) 0.0040 0.0031 0.189
Branching 0.0016 0.0033 0.619
Foreign share -0.0070 0.0024 0.004
Public 0.0015 0.0039 0.697
Total assets 0.0024 0.0008 0.002
Bank stocks 0.2808 0.0754 0.000
Insolvencies -0.0344 0.0059 0.000
Regional employment -0.0089 0.0080 0.268
Stocks -0.9821 0.8032 0.221
Gold cover 0.0137 0.0041 0.001
Constant 0.3065 0.0671 0.000
Select
Deposit growth 1.9609 0.5251 0.000
Deposit growth (-2) 2.0851 0.6180 0.001
Deposit growth (-3) -0.7226 0.7610 0.342
Cash liquidity 0.3168 0.1244 0.011
Cash liquidity (-2) -0.1294 0.1339 0.334
Equity ratio 0.6507 0.2555 0.011
Equity ratio (-2) -0.2944 0.2371 0.214
Branching 0.0632 0.1660 0.703
Foreign share 0.1285 0.1010 0.203
Public 0.0441 0.3804 0.908
Total assets 0.2212 0.0796 0.005
Bank stocks 1.4533 4.5268 0.748
Insolvencies -0.5442 0.3573 0.128
Regional employment 0.0664 0.6473 0.918
Stocks -0.8503 6.6144 0.898
Gold cover 0.1773 0.3505 0.613
Constant 7.5672 4.3975 0.085
Rho 0.0415 0.0627 0.509
# Obs (total) 3800
# Failures 19
Wald test 144.58
p-value 0.0000
Table 3: Results from selection model for growth in total deposits. Notes: All
explanatory variables are lagged by at least one period. For lags greater than one, the
number of lags is given in parentheses.
Another measure of a banks perceived proÞtability is the evolution of its stock
price. Since individual stock prices are not available for all banks in our sample,
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we included the growth of an aggregate price index of bank stocks and it proved
to be strongly signiÞcant.36 Hence, indicators of both liquidity and solvency seem
to have played a role in the evolution of deposits in our sample period.
The branch structure does not have a signiÞcant impact on changes in de-
posits; branch banks do not display signiÞcantly higher deposit growth (or lower
withdrawals) than unit banks. Neither does regional employment, which is to
measure regional shocks, enter signiÞcantly in the equation. In contrast, the
lagged number of national bankruptcies is highly signiÞcant. This indicates that
deposit changes were related rather to national than to regional shocks, implying
that a nationwide branch network offered little protection. It may, of course, also
reßect that our measure of regional shocks is too poor.
The coefficient of the variable total assets is positive and highly signiÞcant,
implying that large banks experienced higher deposit growth, or lower deposit
withdrawals, than small banks, given the riskiness of their portfolios. This is
consistent with a too-big-to-fail interpretation: Large banks creditors may
have trusted in the safety of their deposits, because they believed that their
banks had a high probability of being supported in a crisis. The result is all the
more striking if we compare it to the descriptive results in section 3.2: There we
have seen that large banks experienced particularly high deposit withdrawals. If
we accept the too-big-to-fail interpretation, this means that large banks would
have suffered even higher withdrawals in the absence of an implicit guarantee.
However, we should analyze this issue in more depth before jumping to such a
conclusion. As it stands, the result is also consistent with the view that large
banks were more stable due to diversiÞcation. We will come back to this point
later.
36In another regression, we also included the change in the deposit-to-currency ratio, a vari-
able that has Þgured prominently in the famous analysis of US banking crises by Friedman
and Schwarz (1963). It is typically interpreted as an indicator of the publics conÞdence in the
stability of the banking system. The variable showed a positive sign and was strongly signif-
icant. In the regression shown here, we excluded this variable because its exogeneity may be
questioned.
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4.2.2 Failure equation
We now turn to the interpretation of the selection equation. ρ, which denotes
the correlation coefficient of the disturbances in the two equations and hence the
conditional correlation between changes in deposits and bank survival, shows the
expected sign, but is insigniÞcant. This may be due to the low number of failures
in our sample. It is still worthwhile to have a look at the determinants of bank
survival. Lagged changes in deposits have a positive and signiÞcant effect on bank
survival. Hence, high withdrawals in the past increase the probability of failure.
Bank survival also depends positively on indicators of a banks strength, such as
liquidity and equity ratios. Bank survival seems to be unrelated to the presence
of a branch network and to the level of foreign debt. In contrast, there is a highly
signiÞcant positive effect of bank size on bank survival. Large banks had a higher
probability of survival than small banks. Again, this is consistent with large banks
being too big to fail, but it could also be explained by diversiÞcation effects.
None of the macroeconomic variables enters the selection equation signiÞcantly;
this suggests that the incidence of failures was related much more to bank-speciÞc
characteristics than to macroeconomic variables.
We can conclude that the results from table 3 strongly reject the currency-
crisis hypothesis in that changes in deposits seem to have been related to indica-
tors of banks liquidity and solvency. We can also reject the branching hypothesis
as the maintenance of a branch network seems to affect neither deposit growth
nor bank survival. Finally, the signiÞcant impact of size on deposit growth and
bank survival is consistent with the existence of a too-big-to-fail problem.
4.3 Robustness of results
We performed a large number of robustness checks, some of which are displayed
in the appendix. The robustness checks can be divided into the following cate-
gories: Choice of dependent variable, sample period, bank groups in sample, the
treatment of outliers, and Þnally the estimation method. In the following, we
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explain which effects proved to be robust and which results have to be regarded
with more skepticism.
We Þrst checked whether our results depend on the use of total deposits as
the dependent variable. The inclusion of domestic acceptances may lead to a
bias because acceptances experienced a steep increase from June 1931 on. This
was because banks converted illiquid advances into acceptance loans by allowing
their customers to draw bills on them, discounting the bills, and exchanging them
with another bank to obtain the required third signature. These bills were then
discounted at the Reichsbank, which was against the banking law because the bills
were pure Þnancial bills. We therefore reran our regression excluding domestic
acceptances. The results are virtually unchanged and all effects described above
are robust. In addition, it is conceivable that interbank deposits show different
dynamics than non-bank deposits. We therefore reran our regression using the
item other deposits as dependent variable, which excludes domestic and foreign
acceptances as well as domestic interbank deposits.37 Again all results remain
qualitatively unchanged. Most coefficients, such as the ones of liquidity, the
share of foreign deposits, total assets, and the gold cover, are somewhat higher in
absolute terms than in table 3. Hence, our major results do not appear to hinge
on the choice of the dependent variable.
Second, we checked the choice of the sample period. One may worry that the
dynamics of deposit changes are different in times of crisis than at other times.
We reran the regression from table 3 using only crisis periods, where a crisis
period is deÞned as a month with a decrease in aggregate deposits (see table A3).
Some effects are reinforced in crisis periods, such as the effects of liquidity and
bank stock prices. This can be interpreted as depositors reacting more strongly to
information about their banks strength in times of crisis. The coefficient of the
share of foreign deposits also increases in size, suggesting that foreign withdrawals
37Unfortunately, it is impossible to exclude foreign interbank deposits because these are not
shown separately in banks balance sheets.
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were more important in crisis periods. In contrast, the coefficient of total assets
is no longer signiÞcant in the deposit equation in times of crisis.38 The same is
true for the gold cover. However, total assets remain highly signiÞcant in the
selection equation.
Third, we compared the results for different bank groups. First, we excluded
banks that were not very active in the retail deposit business.39 The results
proved to be robust to this modiÞcation. Then we allowed for a structural break
between the great branch banks and the remaining banks. Interestingly, none of
the effects seems to hinge on the presence of the great branch banks in the sample.
In particular, the size effect remains signiÞcant for the other banks in the deposit
equation. The only signiÞcant deviation between the great branch banks and the
other banks concerns the effect of bank stocks, which is stronger for the great
branch banks. In a Chow test, the structural break proved to be weakly signiÞcant
(p-value = 0.084). Finally, we allowed for a structural break between banks that
were supported in the crisis and those that were not by allowing coefficients to
change after the standby activity. The most important result is that the effect of
liquidity is signiÞcantly smaller for the supported banks. This suggests that the
link between bank-speciÞc characteristics and changes in deposits was weakened
for the supported banks, which is in line with a moral-hazard argument. In fact,
the structural break is signiÞcant at a 5 percent conÞdence level.
Fourth, we analyzed the sensitivity of our results to outliers. In the regression
above, six observations have been excluded because they were suspected to have
an unduly high inßuence on the results.40 We Þrst checked whether the basic
results were still present when we included all observations. As can be seen in
table A4 in the appendix, most coefficients are unaffected. Especially, the results
38This may, however, also be the result of how we deÞned crisis periods. Periods with
aggregate deposit withdrawals tend to be periods in which the deposit withdrawals at the
great banks were particularly large.
39We excluded banks where deposits constituted less than 30 percent of total assets.
40The monthly growth rates of deposits for the left-out observations were between between
minus 78 and 68 percent and between plus 176 and 263 percent, respectively.
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on liquidity, bank stocks, the share of foreign deposits and the gold cover are
very similar. However, the result on size appear not to be robust in the deposit
equation. We then tried to exclude even more observations from the regression.41
Now all results are virtually the same as in table 3. We can conclude that the
presence of outliers does not change our basic conclusions, apart from the effect
of size in the deposit equation.
Finally, we checked our estimation method by re-estimating all regressions
using simple OLS regression with robust standard errors (see table A5). As would
be expected in the light of the insigniÞcance of the correlation coefficient ρ, the
results change only slightly. However, the OLS regressions reveal one noteworthy
Þnding. The R2 of the regressions are very low, mostly well below ten percent.42
This is partly the result of the differencing of the data. It is generally much
easier to explain levels than growth rates. But it is also a reßection of the high
heterogeneity of banks contained in our sample. When running a simple time-
series regression on the aggregate series including only aggregate variables, we
are able to explain around 50 percent of the total variation in the aggregates.
Therefore, the low explanatory power of the regression seems to stem from the
diversity of our sample in the cross-sectional dimension. However, this diversity
should be regarded as a major advantage of the data set as it facilitates the
identiÞcation of effects. The magnitude of the R2 always depends on the data set
in hand and its importance should not be overstated. In addition, the high degree
of heterogeneity could also be taken as evidence against a pure macroeconomic
explanation of the crisis.
We can conclude that most of the effects shown in the basic regression in table
3 are robust to the modiÞcations. In particular, there is a positive and signiÞcant
relationship between a banks liquidity and its deposit growth. There also is
41The number of excluded observations was 21. The monthly growth rates of deposits of the
left-out observations were now in the range of minus 78 and 37 percent, and between plus 55
and 263 percent, respectively.
42The deposit regressions by Saunders and Wilson (1996) also display low R2.
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a positive and signiÞcant relationship between deposit growth and the growth
rate of an index of banks stock prices. Hence, the robustness checks conÞrm
the rejection of the currency-crisis hypothesis. We can also reject the branching
hypothesis as the maintenance of a branch network seems to affect neither deposit
growth nor bank survival. Finally, the relationship between asset size and deposit
growth is not entirely robust. Hence, we cannot assert with conÞdence that larger
banks exhibited higher deposit growth. In contrast, size has a very robust effect
on the survival probability. Thus, we can safely claim that larger banks were less
likely to fail.
5 Econometric analysis of standby activities
5.1 Estimation procedure
The preceding analysis of deposit changes has conÞrmed a necessary condition
for large banks being too big to fail, namely that larger banks had a lower
probability of failure than smaller banks. The results suggest that this may also
have translated into higher deposit growth, even though this effect is not entirely
robust. While both results are consistent with the too-big-to-fail explanation,
they could also imply that large banks were better able to withstand the crisis
for other reasons such as better diversiÞcation. Therefore, we also analyze public
standby activities directly to Þnd out whether large banks received a privileged
treatment in times of crisis. The descriptive analysis in section 3.2 has shown al-
ready that many large banks beneÞted from public support activities and that the
increase in endorsement liabilities in times of crisis was particularly strong at the
larger banks. We will now examine these preliminary Þndings more thoroughly
in an econometric analysis.
First, one can check whether the probability of receiving public support was
higher for larger than for smaller banks. This can be done in a simple, cross-
sectional probit regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable in-
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dicating whether a bank received public support, such as capital injections, public
guarantees, or public loans beyond ordinary reÞnancing loans by the Reichsbank.
On the right-hand side of this regression, one should include a number of control
variables, such as indicators of the banks liquidity and solvency or foreign de-
posits. The question then is whether there remains a signiÞcant effect of a banks
size on the probability of receiving support after controlling for these variables.
Second, one can also look at the provision of liquidity by the Reichsbank.
Public support activities, such as capital injections, would only be employed
when a bank is already close to failure. In contrast, a differential treatment of
banks according to their size with respect to the provision of liquidity may take
place much earlier and may make an outright bail-out unnecessary. In addition, it
can be disguised more easily. The modeling of liquidity provision is more involved
than the modeling of the discrete standby activities. Therefore, we will discuss
the estimation procedure and the assumptions needed for identiÞcation in some
detail.
In order to model endorsement growth, one has to consider the process of
liquidity provision by the Reichsbank. Under the gold standard, monetary policy
had to proceed subject to the constraint that the gold cover did not fall below
the prescribed forty-percent level. This implicitly deÞned a maximum level of
discount loans that could be extended if the central bank did not want to endanger
the maintenance of the gold standard. In normal times, this constraint would
not binding. By setting the discount rate, the Reichsbank could inßuence the
aggregate level of discount loans and it discounted all eligible bills that were
offered by the banks at the prevailing rate. In times of crisis, deÞned as periods
of aggregate deposit withdrawals, the aggregate demand curve for discount loans
would shift outward due to the higher liquidity needs of banks and at the same
time become less elastic. Therefore, an increase in the discount rate would have
only a small impact on the demand for discount loans by the banks. In this kind
of situation, the Reichsbank tended to impose discount restrictions, limiting the
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aggregate quantity of discount loans to the level compatible with the maintenance
of the gold standard, while keeping the discount rate at a relatively low level.
Hence, there were two different policy regimes of liquidity provision, a crisis
regime with credit rationing and a non-crisis regime with free liquidity provision.
This will be taken into account in the econometric analysis by allowing for a
structural break between crisis and non-crisis periods.
The question then is how the Reichsbank distributed the given aggregate level
of discount loans among different banks in the rationing regime. The too-big-
to-fail hypothesis asserts that large banks were given privileged access to the
Reichsbanks rediscounting facilities in times of crisis, meaning that larger banks
were rationed less than smaller banks due to their economic signiÞcance. This
is a statement about the supply of discount loans by the Reichsbank to different
banks. In general, one does not observe the supply directly, but instead one
observes equilibrium points that result from the interplay of demand and supply.
Hence, a higher endorsement growth at larger banks could be due either to a
greater demand by the large banks or to a greater supply by the Reichsbank. In
a rationing regime, however, the level of discount loans equals the minimum of
supply and demand, and changes in the levels of discount loans are determined
by the supply side alone as long as the rationing constraint is binding. This may
be exploited to identify the above supply-side effect.
But even in a rationing regime, it is important to control for variables that shift
the banks demand curves such as the liquidity ratio, the equity ratio, the stock
of bills, and past deposit changes. Demand factors may enter the determination
of endorsement growth in two ways: First, the Reichsbank may react to banks
demand in setting quotas, allocating more discount loans to banks that need them
most. Second, it is possible that not all rationing constraints are binding because
some banks demand is smaller than their quotas.
Therefore, the crucial assumption needed to identify the supply effect in ques-
tion is that large banks do not have a higher growth in their demand for discount
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loans than smaller banks in times of crisis, holding constant the observed shift fac-
tors of the demand curves. A signiÞcantly positive effect of size on endorsement
growth can then be interpreted as a higher supply by the Reichsbank, reßecting
the large banks privileged access to the Reichsbanks rediscounting facilities in
times of crisis.
In Schnabel (2002), we have already presented some qualitative evidence that
discount restrictions were applied very selectively and that large banks received
preferential treatment at the Reichsbanks discount window in times of crisis.43
However, it is difficult to separate the effect of size from other factors, such as
foreign deposits and the maintenance of a branch network, because the great
branch banks were not only large, but they also held particularly high shares
of foreign deposits and maintained nationwide branch network. Here we try to
separate these factors statistically by checking whether the size of banks has a
statistically signiÞcant impact on the allocation of discount loans to different
banks, controlling for other factors such as foreign deposits or the existence of a
branch network.
Note that the regression of endorsement liabilities suffers from the same se-
lection problem as the regression of deposit changes. The presence of a bank in
the sample depends on how much liquidity it receives from the Reichsbank and
is, therefore, not random. Hence, we apply the same estimation procedure as in
table 3 in order to control for non-random sample attrition.44
5.2 Estimation results
5.2.1 Probability of support
We will Þrst present the results from the regression of the probability of being
supported before discussing the estimation for endorsement liabilities. Table 4
43Note that, apart from setting different quotas, the Reichsbank could also impose different
quality requirements with respect to the submitted bills.
44Here, we use a number of lagged macroeconomic variables (such as insolvencies, employ-
ment, stock prices) as instruments.
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presents the results of the simple probit regression described above. The depen-
dent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a bank received public
support. The regression is cross-sectional, and the independent variables refer
to April 1931, the month before the beginning of the Þnal banking crisis.45 The
most important result is that the size of a bank has a signiÞcantly positive effect
on the probability that a bank receives public support, which conÞrms the pre-
liminary Þnding from the descriptive analysis in section 3.2. As predicted by the
too-big-to-fail hypothesis, large banks were more likely to be supported than
small banks. The branching variable is weakly signiÞcant. In fact, wide-spread
branch networks can be interpreted here as measuring another aspect of size,
namely geographical dispersion. Moreover, we Þnd that the supported banks ap-
pear to have had particularly low Þrst-order liquidity ratios.46 In contrast, there
is neither a relationship with the equity ratio, nor with the level of foreign debt.47
Dependent 
variable
Independent 
variables
Coefficient Robust 
standard errors
p-value
Support
First-order liquidity -0.0743 0.0396 0.008
Equity ratio 0.0278 0.0402 0.474
Branching 0.1242 0.0472 0.094
Foreign share 0.0377 0.0277 0.188
Total assets 0.0446 0.0201 0.003
# Obs 91
Pseudo R² 0.3264
Table 4: Results from probit regression for standby activities. Notes: All
explanatory variables refer to April 1931.
45Note that the results are displayed such that the coefficients correspond to the change in
the probability of being supported for an inÞnitesimal change in each independent continuous
variable, and to the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.
46If one uses the cash liquidity ratio instead, the coefficient becomes insigniÞcant.
47The variable public is not identiÞed here because it perfectly predicts the outcome no
support. An exclusion of the public banks changes the results only slighty. In fact, the effect of
total assets increases somewhat in size. However, the branching variable becomes insigniÞcant.
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5.2.2 Endorsement liabilities
Table 5 presents the results from the selection model for the growth in endorse-
ment liabilities. The correlation coefficient ρ is again insigniÞcant (see table 5).
The results for the selection equation are suppressed here because they are very
similar to the ones in the other table. In the main equation, the dependent vari-
able is the logarithm of the growth factor of other endorsement liabilities. We
allowed for a structural break between crisis and non-crisis periods, where a crisis
period is deÞned as a month with a decrease in aggregate deposits. On the right-
hand side of the regression, we included a number of bank-speciÞc variables that
are to capture the shifts in individual demand curves as well as one aggregate
variable, the gold cover, which accounts for the constraints imposed upon the
Reichsbank by the gold standard.48
The panel on the left of table 5 displays the coefficients for non-crisis periods,
while the panel on the right shows the estimates for crisis periods. We are mostly
interested in the right-hand-side results because only in crisis periods we would
expect there to be an effect of a banks size on endorsement growth under the
too-big-to-fail hypothesis.49
The regression results strongly support the conjecture that large banks re-
ceived preferential access to the Reichsbanks rediscounting facilities in times of
crisis. Endorsement growth in crisis periods is signiÞcantly related to the size of
banks, given the other bank-speciÞc variables. In contrast, size does not matter
in non-crisis periods. This is exactly what would have been expected under the
too-big-to-fail hypothesis.
48Note that the regression in table 5 is not a demand or supply curve. The effect of the
price variable is not modeled here. Instead, the regression gives the allocation of discount loans
across different banks.
49In fact, there is no evidence for the discrimination of smaller banks in normal times in
the Reichsbanks archival materials; instead it seems that liquidity was provided freely and
non-discriminatory at the prevailing discount rate.
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Dependent 
variable
Independent variables Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value Independent variables Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value
Endorsement 
growth
Total assets 0.0008 0.0040 0.848 Total assets 0.0142 0.0060 0.018
Endorsement growth -0.0782 0.0423 0.065 Endorsement growth -0.1153 0.0394 0.003
Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0405 0.0338 0.232 Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0442 0.0309 0.152
Endorsement growth (-3) -0.0294 0.0294 0.317 Endorsement growth (-3) -0.0626 0.0378 0.097
Deposit growth 0.3242 0.0978 0.001 Deposit growth 0.3079 0.0981 0.002
Deposit growth (-2) -0.0247 0.0629 0.694 Deposit growth (-2) 0.1426 0.1284 0.267
Deposit growth (-3) -0.0694 0.0836 0.406 Deposit growth (-3) 0.1413 0.0975 0.147
Share of bills 0.0154 0.0067 0.023 Share of bills 0.0217 0.0079 0.006
Cash liquidity -0.0105 0.0087 0.226 Cash liquidity -0.0258 0.0129 0.045
Equity ratio -0.0079 0.0128 0.536 Equity ratio 0.0143 0.0190 0.452
Foreign share -0.0150 0.0126 0.233 Foreign share -0.0130 0.0158 0.411
Branching 0.0117 0.0159 0.462 Branching 0.0120 0.0215 0.577
Public 0.0133 0.0332 0.689 Public -0.0496 0.0307 0.106
Gold cover -0.0116 0.0321 0.719 Gold cover 0.0546 0.0206 0.008
Constant -0.1007 0.0539 0.062 Constant -0.0626 0.0692 0.366
Select ...
Rho -0.010 0.376 0.980
# Obs (total) 3,689
# Failures 19
Wald test 
Chi²(30):
121.42
p-value 0.0000
No crisis Crisis
Table 5: Results from selection model for growth in endorsement liabilities,
allowing for a structural break between crisis and non-crisis periods. Notes: All
explanatory variables are lagged by at least one period. For lags greater than one, the
number of lags is given in parentheses.
It is also instructive to examine the other coefficients in the regression even
though one has to be careful with a structural interpretation of these coefficients.
In both crisis and non-crisis periods, the growth in endorsement liabilities displays
a negative autocorrelation, meaning that high growth rates were likely to be
followed by small ones and vice versa. In times of crisis, a lower cash liquidity
implied a higher growth in endorsement liabilities, reßecting the greater need for
liquidity. However, the discounting of bills was only possible if the bank actually
possessed bill material eligible for discount. This explains the highly signiÞcant
coefficient of the share of bills in total assets. The same effect is also present in
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non-crisis periods. If liquidity pressure was a driving force of endorsement growth
in times of crisis, one would also expect past deposit growth to have a negative
effect on endorsement growth. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect is positive and
highly signiÞcant in both crisis and non-crisis periods.50
Another interesting result is the insigniÞcant coefficient of the share of foreign
deposits in times of crisis, which suggests that banks holding high levels of foreign
debt were not favored in the provision of discount loans. Neither does the growth
of endorsement liabilities depend on the equity ratio, the branching variable, or
on whether a bank is public or private. Finally, the gold cover enters positively
in times of crisis and is highly signiÞcant, which reßects the constraints imposed
upon the Reichsbank by the gold standard. The higher the gold cover, the wider
the Reichsbanks scope for rediscounting activities.
We can conclude that there is strong evidence for a privileged treatment of
large banks, both with respect to public supporting activities, such as capital in-
jections and public guarantees, and with respect to rediscounting. In combination
with our Þndings on deposit changes and bank failures, this is strong evidence
for the too-big-to-fail hypothesis.
5.3 Robustness of results
In this subsection, we check the robustness of our results from the regression of
endorsement liabilities. The simple probit regression does not lend itself to a
robustness analysis. As before, we examined the robustness of our results to the
choice of the dependent variable, the sample period, the bank groups included in
the sample, the treatment of outliers, and Þnally the estimation method. We will
mostly concentrate on the coefficient of total assets in the discussion.
By choosing the item other endorsement liabilities as our dependent variable
we excluded bank acceptances and promissory notes. In order to check whether
this introduces a bias into our results, we reran the regression from table 5 using
50It is important to control for lagged deposit changes to account for the effect detected in
the earlier regression, namely that large banks may experience lower deposit withdrawals.
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the variable total endorsement liabilities as dependent variable. We Þnd that
our results are robust to the choice of the dependent variable, with the p-value
of the coefficient of total assets being somewhat higher than before (p-value =
0.062).
Then we checked the robustness of results to the choice of the sample period.
The process of liquidity provision may have changed after the factual abandon-
ment of the gold standard because this removed an important constraint on mon-
etary policy. Therefore, we reran the regression allowing for another structural
break after July 1931 (see table A6). In fact, the results show some notable
changes compared to the pooled regression. First, the size of a bank is signiÞcant
only in crisis periods before the bank holiday, while it turns insigniÞcant after
July 1931. This suggests that large banks were privileged primarily in times when
the gold standard constraint was still binding. Second, the share of bills and the
gold cover are signiÞcant for crisis and non-crisis periods before July 1931, but
turn in both cases insigniÞcant after July 1931. This indicates that the provision
of liquidity in the latter period was no longer limited by gold standard consid-
erations, nor by the availability of bills. A Chow test shows that the structural
break is, in fact, signiÞcant at the 5 percent level.
Again we checked whether the results hinged on the presence of particular
bank groups in the sample. The results are virtually unchanged when we exclude
banks that were not very active in the retail deposit business. In contrast, the co-
efficient of total assets becomes insigniÞcant when we exclude the great branch
banks. Hence, the results appear to be driven mostly by the privileged treatment
of the great branch banks.
In the regression presented in table 5 we have excluded outliers.51 For en-
dorsement liabilities the problem of outliers is particularly severe as endorsement
liabilities tend to be very volatile. Small absolute changes can translate into enor-
51We excluded 25 outliers. Their growth rates of endorsement liabilities ranged from minus
95 to 87 percent, and from plus 698 to 2,900 percent.
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mous growth rates if the initial level was close to zero. Again all major effects
appear to be insensitive to the exclusion of outliers, which can be seen from table
A7 in the appendix. The same is true when we exclude an even larger number of
outliers.52 Hence, we can conclude that our results do not hinge on the exclusion
of outliers.
Finally, we reran the basic regression using OLS instead of the Heckman
procedure. Again the results are very similar to the former results, and again the
Þt of the regression appears to be relatively poor as judged by the R2.
Therefore, we can conclude that the results from table 5, especially the one
concerning total assets, are extremely robust. This strongly supports the view
that large banks enjoyed preferential access to the Reichsbanks rediscounting
facilities.
6 Conclusion
The main results from this paper can be summarized by going back to the three
hypotheses stated in the beginning of the paper. It is clearly inappropriate to
describe the German crisis of 1931 as a pure currency crisis, and the banking crisis
as an inevitable corollary. It is true that the currency problems had an impact
on banks deposit growth and that banks holding foreign debt lost more deposits
than other banks. But it was also shown that illiquid banks lost more deposits
than liquid banks, indicating that depositors withdrew their funds primarily from
banks that were thought to be particularly fragile. The positive autocorrelation
of deposit growth could be interpreted in the same way. Similarly, depositors
reacted to indicators of banks solvency, namely the change in the index of banks
stock prices, while the individual equity ratio did not exert a signiÞcant inßuence.
The incidence of failures seems to have been related much more to bank-speciÞc
characteristics, such as lagged deposit growth, liquidity and equity ratios, than
52Here we excluded 94 outliers. The respective growth rates of endorsement liabilities were
between minus 95 and 64 percent and between plus 173 and 2,900 percent, respectively.
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to macroeconomic variables. Thus, both deposit growth and the incidence of
failures suggest that the (macroeconomic) currency crisis was accompanied by a
(microeconomic) banking crisis that had independent origins and was not purely
caused by the concurrent currency problems. Hence, we can reject the currency-
crisis hypothesis.
The results also contradict the branching hypothesis. Branch banks exhibited
neither higher deposit growth (or lower withdrawals) in times of crisis, nor a
lower probability of failure. Hence, the evidence suggests that branch networks
offered little protection in the German crisis. This does not necessarily mean
that branch networks in general do not offer any protection. It is also consistent
with the view that national shocks were more prevalent in the German crisis than
regional shocks. In fact, regional employment did affect neither deposit growth
nor the incidence of bank failures signiÞcantly.
The third hypothesis stated that larger banks have a lower probability of
failure and  given the riskiness of their portfolios  lower deposit withdrawals
than smaller banks because they have a higher probability of being saved by the
public authorities in case of a crisis. This hypothesis was named the too-big-to-
fail hypothesis. In our main speciÞcation, we found a positive and signiÞcant
effect of total assets on deposit changes. However, this result appeared not
to be entirely robust. Moreover, the size of a bank also had a positive and
signiÞcant impact on the probability of survival, and this result proved to be
robust in all of our robustness checks. Both effects could, however, also be due
to a diversiÞcation effect. Therefore, we investigated this issue more directly by
looking at the probability of receiving public support and at the growth rate of
endorsement liabilities, which are a good proxy for the extent of rediscounting
at the Reichsbank. In a simple cross-sectional regression, we found that the
probability of receiving public support depended strongly on the banks total
assets. In addition, there was a strong and signiÞcant effect of total assets on
the growth of endorsement liabilities in times of crisis, which suggests that large
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banks received preferential access to the Reichsbanks discount window. This
result proved to be very robust in our robustness checks. This is strong evidence
for the too-big-to-fail hypothesis.
These Þndings are not only of interest for the economic historian, but their
message reaches well beyond the historical case. First, our evidence adds to the
literature on twin crises. We have shown that currency problems can translate
into deposit withdrawals at banks, possibly endangering these banks liquidity
and solvency positions. The results suggest, however, that the currency problems
were not the only driving factors for the banking crisis. Instead, there were a
number of other factors, such as the macroeconomic downturn and idiosyncratic
problems in the banking system, which affected deposit withdrawals and bank
failures equally strongly or even more strongly. Hence, it is questionable whether
currency problems alone would be sufficient to cause a full-blown banking crisis
as the one in 1931. Instead, it seems that what makes twin crises particularly
serious is the accumulation of different problems that tend to reinforce each other,
as has been described in Schnabel (2002).
Second, the results suggest that one should not overestimate the beneÞts of
branching. In macroeconomic crises, the diversiÞcation effect offered by branch
networks may be negligible, as the prevalent risks are not diversiÞable. In fact,
since branch banks also tend to be large banks, branch banks may bring about
other problems: they may suffer from a moral-hazard problem because the public
and the central bank consider these banks to be too big to fail. As our paper
shows this problem does not depend on the existence of official deposit insurance,
as there was no such insurance in Germany at that time. In fact, depositors did
run on the great banks to withdraw their deposits. However, the disciplining
effect of bank runs was impaired by the public authorities, both by providing
preferential access to liquidity and by outright bail-outs. One important challenge
of bank regulation will be how to deal with these types of problems in a globalizing
world of ever growing banks.
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Nowadays, the German banking system is again in a delicate situation. Ger-
man banks once again suffer from loan portfolios fraught with bad loans, from
losses in their securities portfolios, and from the inertia in investment banking.
Rents have decreased due to Þerce competition, not least from the side of the
public (and publicly subsidized) banks. The newspapers already start talking
about a German banking crisis. An interesting question arises: Would the great
banks still be too big to fail?
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data construction
Foreign debt variables The variable foreign share used in our regression
analysis is deÞned as the share of foreign deposits in total deposits. The variable
was calculated for June 30, 1930 only as there are no continuous time series for a
sufficiently large number of banks. The levels of foreign acceptance loans can be
obtained from banks monthly balance sheets, but the levels of foreign cash loans
can only be inferred from archival material. For June 1930, the Reichsbanks
archival material contains detailed information on the levels of foreign debt for
those banks holding large amounts of foreign debt. In addition, it contains the
aggregate level of foreign deposits for all monthly reporting banks. In order to
estimate the levels of foreign cash loans at individual banks, the non-attributable
part of the aggregate level of cash loans was distributed evenly among the remain-
ing credit banks, assuming that the SLGs did not hold any foreign cash loans,
unless it was speciÞed explicitly in the Reichsbanks material.53 For banks that
did not publish balance sheets in June 1930, the levels of acceptance loans were
updated on the basis of the aggregate evolution of acceptance loans.
53This assumption is consistent with the statement in Enquete-Ausschuß (1930, p. 80) that
the bulk of banks foreign debt was held by the German credit banks and private bankers, not
the SLGs.
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Bank failures and official standby activities Table A1 lists those banks
that we have classiÞed as failures, distress mergers, and as banks receiving official
support as well as the respective dates. The classiÞcation differs somewhat from
the one proposed by Petri (1998, p. 99).
Date Bank name ClassiÞed as ...
Sep 28 Berliner Bankverein Failure
Sep 29 Kieler Bank Failure
Nov 29 Bankverein Bischofswerda Failure
Dec 29 Ostbank fu¨r Handel und Gewerbe Distress merger
Feb 30 Frankfurter Bankverein Failure
Dec 30 Rheinisch-Westfa¨lische Getreide-Kredit AG Failure
May 31 Hansabank Oberschlesien Failure
May 31 Bankhaus Bu¨hl und Co. Failure
May 31 Rheinische Bauernbank Standby
Jun 31 Gewerbebank Distress merger
Jul 31 Dresdner Bank Standby
Jul 31 Darmsta¨dter und Nationalbank (Danatbank) Standby
Jul 31 Allgemeine Deutsche Credit-Anstalt Standby
Aug 31 Hallescher Bankenverein von Kulisch, Kaempf & Co. Standby
Aug 31 Leipziger Credit-Bank Standby
Sep 31 Bank fu¨r Handel und Gewerbe Failure
Sep 31 Leipziger Credit-Bank Failure
Sep 31 Leipziger Immobilien-Gesellschaft Bank fu¨r Grundbesitz AG Failure
Oct 31 Rheinische Bauernbank Failure
Oct 31 Hollandsche Credietbank Failure
Nov 31 Vorschuß- und Spar-Vereins-Bank in Lu¨beck Failure
Dec 31 Anhalt-Dessauische Landesbank Standby
Dec 31 Commerz-Bank in Lu¨beck Standby
Feb 32 Wernigero¨der Bank fu¨r Handel und Gewerbe Failure
Feb 32 Dresdner Bank (merged with Danatbank) Standby
Feb 32 Commerz- und Privat-Bank (merged with Barmer Bank-Verein) Standby
Feb 32 Allgemeine Deutsche Credit-Anstalt Standby
Feb 32 Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft Standby
Jun 32 Sta¨dte- und Staatsbank der Oberlausitz Failure
Jun 32 Anhalt-Dessauische Landesbank Distress merger
Jul 32 Bernburger Bank Failure
Aug 32 Westfalenbank Standby
Table A1: Bank failures, distress mergers, and official standby activities. Source:
Die Bank.
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Descriptive statistics The following table contains the descriptive statistics
of the variables used in the regressions. If the variables enter the regressions in
logarithmic forms, the given statistics refer to the variables before the logarithmic
transformation. The sources are denoted as follows: 1 = Deutscher Reichs- und
Preußischer Staatsanzeiger, 2 = Salings Bo¨rsenpapiere (1930), 3 = Bundesarchiv
Berlin (Reichsbank R2501, diverse Þles), 4 = Die Bank (diverse issues), 5 =
Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1936), 6 = James (1985, pp. 358).
Variable name Description Functional 
form
# Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources
Deposit growth Total deposits (including acceptances) log of growth 
factor
3781 0.997 0.071 0.428 2.190 1
Cash liquidity (Cash + deposits at central bank) / 
total deposits (including acceptances)
log 3800 0.026 0.020 0.000 0.283 1
First-order 
liquidity
(Cash + deposits at central bank + 
deposits at other banks + bills of 
3800 0.340 0.478 0.006 10.905 1
Equity ratio (Capital + reserves) / total assets log 3800 0.214 0.143 0.048 0.878 1
Branching Dummy = 1 if number of branches > 1, 
0 otherwise
3800 0.680 0.466 0 1 2
Foreign share Foreign deposits / total deposits on 
June 30, 1930
log 3800 0.155 0.137 0.007 0.814 3
Public Dummy = 1 if bank is public, 0 
otherwise
3800 0.061 0.240 0 1 2, 4
Total assets Total assets in million Reichsmark log 3800 165.4 568.4 0.9 5726.8 1
Bank stocks Stock index for bank shares log of growth 
factor
3800 0.987 0.020 0.942 1.033 5
Insolvencies Number of corporate insolvencies log 3800 1247 291 727 1972 5
Regional 
employment
Regional number of employees, 
January 1928 = 100
log 3800 93.7 14.8 62.0 140.8 5
Stocks General stock index [Descriptive 
statistics refer to the stock index 
without interaction]
log of growth 
factor, 
interacted 
with share of 
stocks
3800 0.988 0.040 0.898 1.130 5
Share of stocks Share of security portfolio in total 
assets
3800 0.063 0.098 0.000 0.874 1
Gold cover Reichsbank reserves / Reichsbank 
note circulation
log 3800 0.478 0.138 0.225 0.657 5, 6
Endorsement 
growth
Endorsement liabilities log of growth 
factor
3670 1.028 0.408 0.140 7.000 1
Share of bills Bills of exchange / Total assets log  3689 0.138 0.100 0.000 0.863 1
Table A2: DeÞnition of variables, descriptive statistics, and sources.
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7.2 Tables for the robustness checks
The following tables contain selected regression results from the robustness sec-
tions. As before, all explanatory variables are lagged by one period unless noted
otherwise.
7.2.1 Deposit changes
Dependent 
variable
Independent 
variables
Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value
Deposit 
growth
Deposit growth (-2) 0.0077 0.0435 0.860
Deposit growth (-3) 0.0970 0.0452 0.032
Cash liquidity (-2) 0.0106 0.0034 0.002
Equity ratio (-2) 0.0029 0.0045 0.518
Branching 0.0058 0.0048 0.234
Foreign share -0.0088 0.0040 0.026
Public 0.0077 0.0059 0.192
Total assets 0.0007 0.0013 0.598
Bank stocks 0.4367 0.1632 0.007
Insolvencies -0.0448 0.0121 0.000
Regional employment 0.0032 0.0119 0.791
Stocks -1.6741 1.5957 0.294
Gold cover 0.0007 0.0062 0.913
Constant 0.3208 0.1030 0.002
Select
Deposit growth 2.0356 0.6874 0.003
Deposit growth (-2) 1.9196 0.8355 0.022
Deposit growth (-3) -1.1305 0.7115 0.112
Cash liquidity 0.3070 0.1134 0.007
Cash liquidity (-2) -0.0941 0.1220 0.441
Equity ratio 0.8323 0.3938 0.035
Equity ratio (-2) -0.4220 0.3771 0.263
Branching 0.1455 0.1903 0.445
Foreign share 0.1415 0.1255 0.259
Public -0.1020 0.4208 0.808
Total assets 0.2384 0.0965 0.014
Bank stocks -1.1860 8.4640 0.889
Insolvencies -0.8229 0.5614 0.143
Regional employment 0.5304 0.9766 0.587
Stocks -6.0124 17.9052 0.737
Gold cover 0.0173 0.5324 0.974
Constant 7.4184 5.0811 0.144
Rho 0.0470 0.0865 0.587
# Obs (total) 1,685
# Failures 13
Wald test 
Chi²(14): 65.30
p-value 0.0000
Table A3: Robustness check for deposit changes  Restriction of sample to crisis
periods.
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Dependent 
variable
Independent 
variables
Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value
Deposit 
growth
Deposit growth (-2) 0.0523 0.0409 0.202
Deposit growth (-3) 0.0736 0.0430 0.087
Cash liquidity (-2) 0.0070 0.0023 0.003
Equity ratio (-2) 0.0019 0.0042 0.657
Branching 0.0002 0.0040 0.951
Foreign deposits -0.0060 0.0028 0.033
Public 0.0016 0.0041 0.689
Total assets 0.0016 0.0011 0.164
Bank stocks 0.2374 0.0801 0.003
Insolvencies -0.0356 0.0070 0.000
Regional employment -0.0098 0.0087 0.262
Stocks -1.0474 0.8334 0.209
Gold cover 0.0163 0.0047 0.000
Constant 0.3195 0.0796 0.000
Select
Deposit growth 1.9659 0.5201 0.000
Deposit growth (-2) 2.0692 0.6154 0.001
Deposit growth (-3) -0.7706 0.7447 0.301
Cash liquidity 0.3182 0.1226 0.009
Cash liquidity (-2) -0.1253 0.1317 0.341
Equity ratio 0.6603 0.2591 0.011
Equity ratio (-2) -0.2998 0.2417 0.215
Branching 0.0629 0.1657 0.704
Foreign deposits 0.1222 0.0995 0.220
Public 0.0404 0.3792 0.915
Total assets 0.2239 0.0799 0.005
Bank stocks 1.3954 4.5424 0.759
Insolvencies -0.5435 0.3567 0.128
Regional employment 0.0611 0.6488 0.925
Stocks -1.1269 6.3644 0.859
Gold cover 0.1742 0.3509 0.620
Constant 7.5919 4.3994 0.084
Rho 0.0034 0.0387 0.929
# Obs (total) 3,806
# Failures 19
Wald test 
Chi²(14): 107.44
p-value 0.0000
Table A4: Robustness check for deposit changes  Sensitivity to outliers.
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Dependent 
variable
Independent 
variables
Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value
Deposit 
growth
Deposit growth (-2) 0.0411 0.0321 0.200
Deposit growth (-3) 0.0753 0.0270 0.005
Cash liquidity (-2) 0.0078 0.0020 0.000
Equity ratio (-2) 0.0040 0.0031 0.192
Branching 0.0016 0.0033 0.622
Foreign deposits -0.0070 0.0024 0.004
Public 0.0015 0.0039 0.699
Total assets 0.0024 0.0008 0.002
Bank stocks 0.2807 0.0756 0.000
Insolvencies -0.0343 0.0059 0.000
Regional employment -0.0089 0.0080 0.269
Stocks -0.9821 0.8043 0.222
Gold cover 0.0137 0.0042 0.001
Constant 0.3062 0.0673 0.000
# Obs 3,781
R² 0.048
Table A5: Robustness check for deposit changes  OLS regression.
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7.2.2 Endorsement liabilities
Dependent 
variable
Independent variables Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value Independent variables Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value
Endorsement 
growth
Total assets 0.0004 0.0042 0.930 Total assets 0.0201 0.0081 0.013
Endorsement growth -0.0666 0.0447 0.136 Endorsement growth -0.1339 0.0521 0.010
Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0379 0.0375 0.312 Endorsement growth (-2) -0.1183 0.0563 0.035
Endorsement growth (-3) -0.0483 0.0338 0.153 Endorsement growth (-3) -0.0775 0.0587 0.187
Deposit growth 0.3961 0.1253 0.002 Deposit growth 0.3001 0.1489 0.044
Deposit growth (-2) 0.0102 0.0866 0.906 Deposit growth (-2) -0.1692 0.1806 0.349
Deposit growth (-3) -0.0570 0.1037 0.582 Deposit growth (-3) 0.0316 0.0895 0.724
Share of bills 0.0156 0.0067 0.021 Share of bills 0.0267 0.0105 0.011
Cash liquidity -0.0126 0.0085 0.141 Cash liquidity -0.0079 0.0142 0.579
Equity ratio -0.0129 0.0132 0.326 Equity ratio 0.0027 0.0237 0.910
Branching 0.0154 0.0160 0.336 Branching 0.0060 0.0257 0.817
Foreign share -0.0206 0.0127 0.104 Foreign share 0.0216 0.0186 0.245
Public 0.0056 0.0364 0.877 Public -0.0271 0.0359 0.451
Gold cover 0.1348 0.0618 0.029 Gold cover 0.1213 0.0675 0.072
Constant -0.0442 0.0684 0.518 Constant 0.0994 0.0850 0.242
Total assets 0.0079 0.0146 0.589 Total assets 0.0106 0.0094 0.261
Endorsement growth -0.1094 0.1181 0.354 Endorsement growth -0.1196 0.0515 0.020
Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0613 0.0809 0.448 Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0181 0.0387 0.640
Endorsement growth (-3) 0.0731 0.0707 0.301 Endorsement growth (-3) -0.0537 0.0486 0.268
Deposit growth 0.1098 0.1324 0.407 Deposit growth 0.2873 0.1483 0.053
Deposit growth (-2) -0.0421 0.1074 0.695 Deposit growth (-2) 0.1996 0.2191 0.362
Deposit growth (-3) -0.1286 0.1559 0.410 Deposit growth (-3) 0.1351 0.1616 0.403
Share of bills 0.0197 0.0282 0.484 Share of bills 0.0141 0.0117 0.229
Cash liquidity 0.0213 0.0452 0.637 Cash liquidity -0.0329 0.0222 0.139
Equity ratio 0.0368 0.0545 0.500 Equity ratio 0.0347 0.0308 0.261
Branching -0.0290 0.0743 0.696 Branching 0.0137 0.0344 0.690
Foreign share 0.0140 0.0470 0.766 Foreign share -0.0526 0.0251 0.036
Public 0.0801 0.0683 0.240 Public -0.0638 0.0511 0.212
Gold cover 0.5247 0.9607 0.585 Gold cover -0.0785 0.0832 0.345
Constant 0.9431 1.3452 0.483 Constant -0.3200 0.1691 0.058
Select ...
Rho 0.039 0.174 0.823
# Obs (total) 3,689
# Failures 19
Wald test 
Chi²(60):
163.35
p-value 0.0000
No crisis, until July 1931 Crisis, until July 1931
No crisis, after July 1931 Crisis, after July 1931
Table A6: Robustness check for growth in endorsement liabilities  Allowing for
structural break after July 1931.
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Dependent 
variable
Independent variables Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value Independent variables Coefficient Robust 
standard 
errors
p-value
Endorsement 
growth
Total assets 0.0011 0.0048 0.828 Total assets 0.0132 0.0065 0.043
Endorsement growth -0.1463 0.0653 0.025 Endorsement growth -0.2012 0.0594 0.001
Endorsement growth (-2) -0.1090 0.0499 0.029 Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0609 0.0503 0.226
Endorsement growth (-3) 0.0061 0.0436 0.889 Endorsement growth (-3) -0.0990 0.0433 0.022
Deposit growth 0.2904 0.1017 0.004 Deposit growth 0.4021 0.1266 0.001
Deposit growth (-2) -0.0130 0.0759 0.865 Deposit growth (-2) 0.1573 0.1406 0.263
Deposit growth (-3) -0.1226 0.1033 0.235 Deposit growth (-3) 0.1868 0.1239 0.132
Share of bills 0.0088 0.0078 0.259 Share of bills 0.0294 0.0089 0.001
Cash liquidity -0.0132 0.0111 0.238 Cash liquidity -0.0346 0.0149 0.021
Equity ratio -0.0170 0.0148 0.248 Equity ratio 0.0176 0.0223 0.430
Branching 0.0101 0.0181 0.576 Branching 0.0103 0.0247 0.676
Foreign share -0.0116 0.0147 0.430 Foreign share -0.0034 0.0203 0.867
Public -0.0086 0.0404 0.832 Public -0.0853 0.0437 0.051
Gold cover -0.0299 0.0357 0.402 Gold cover 0.0638 0.0253 0.012
Constant -0.1502 0.0594 0.011 Constant -0.0335 0.0850 0.694
Select ...
Rho -0.1482 0.1207 0.226
# Obs (total) 3,714
# Failures 19
Wald test 
Chi²(30):
138.97
p-value 0.0000
No crisis Crisis
Table A7: Robustness check for growth in endorsement liabilities  Sensitivity
to outliers.
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